Past Speaker Events – Students Against Pseudoscience

Ig Nobel: The whimsy and the magic of science

Author: Maya Lopez (Co-President)

When the 2025 Nobel Prizes were announced last month, Cambridge’s science enthusiasts and news junkies alike were buzzing with excitement, discussing the laureates, dissecting the research, and tallying college wins. However, I noticed less talk around a month earlier on the Ig Nobels”. Maybe because no Cambridge members were awarded this year? Or perhaps because it’s not serious enough?? … Whatever the reason, today we will take a break from all the rigidity of science and the recent serious concerns around politics contesting science. Instead, let’s take a look at the whimsical research that is also… seriously a science, which, as Nature once put it, “The Ig Nobel awards are arguably the highlight of the scientific calendar”.

Are Ig Nobel Prizes a real award?

This is one of the top Google searches with the keywords: “Ig Nobel prize”. The answer? YES*. It is a very real award with ceremony and all that has now been going on for 35 years. But “*” was not a typo as it is also, yes, a parody of the all-too-famous Nobel Prize, which probably needs no explanation of its own (hence the namesake and the pun of “ignoble”). For those of you who are unfamiliar, Ig Nobel is annually awarded by an organization called Improbable Research since 1991 with a motto of: “research that makes people LAUGH, then THINK”. This organization also publishes a “scientific humor magazine” (who knew that was a thing?) called Annals of Improbable Research (AIR), so they, in a sense, can be seen as a specialist that focuses on promoting public engagement with scientific research through fun. The Ig Nobel Prizes are often presented by Nobel laureates in a ceremony held at the MIT or other universities in the Boston area. Much like the “real” Nobel prizes, it has different award disciplines like: physics, chemistry, physiology/medicine, literature, economics, and peace, plus a few extra categories such as public health, engineering, biology, and interdisciplinary research. (The award categories do vary from year to year, though.) The winners are awarded with a banknote worth 10 trillion Zimbabwean dollars (a currency that is no longer used; roughly worth US$0.40), so it’s not really about the monetary value. They also get an opportunity to give a public lecture upon award, but researchers do face the risk of being interrupted by an 8-year-old girl (or, in the case of 2025, a researcher dressed up as one) crying “Please stop: I’m bored”, if it dares go on for too long. The ceremony, as you can imagine from here, has a number of running jokes, and if you are interested, you can watch the whole ceremony of 2025 on Youtube.

Bringing “in” science to the everyday curiosity:

So it’s a parody, yes, but the award does exist and is given to actual researchers. The quickest way to get a sense of the Ig Nobel might be to simply browse the list of research that was awarded prizes. This year, we’ve got:

Category	Title	Reference
Aviation	Studying whether ingesting alcohol can impair bats’ ability to fly and also‹ their ability to echolocate	_{doi.org/10.1016/j.beproc.2010.02.006}
Biology	their experiments to learn whether cows painted with zebra-like striping can avoid being bitten by flies.	_{doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0223447}
Chemistry	experiments to test whether eating Teflon is a good way to increase food volume and hence satiety without increasing calorie content	_{doi.org/10.1177%2F1932296815626726}_{patents.google.com/patent/US9924736B2/en}
Engineering design	analyzing, from an engineering design perspective, how foul-smelling shoes affect the good experience of using a shoe-rack	_{doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2229-8_33}
Literature	persistently recording and analyzing the rate of growth of one of his fingernails over a period of 35 years	_{doi.org/10.1038/jid.1953.5}_{pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2249062}_{doi.org/10.1001/archinte.1968.00300090069016} _{doi.org/10.1001/archinte.1974.00320210107015} _{doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-4362.1976.tb00696.x} _{doi.org/10.1001/archinte.1980.00330130075019}
Nutrition	studying the extent to which a certain kind of lizard chooses to eat certain kinds of pizza	_{doi.org/10.1111/aje.13100}
Peace	showing that drinking alcohol sometimes improves a person’s ability to speak in a foreign language	_{doi.org/10.1177/0269881117735687}
Pediatrics	studying what a nursing baby experiences when the baby’s mother eats garlic	_{pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/1896276}
Physics	discoveries about the physics of pasta sauce, especially the phase transition that can lead to clumping, which can be a cause of unpleasantness	_{doi.org/10.1063/5.0255841}
Psychology	investigating what happens when you tell narcissists — or anyone else — that they are intelligent	_{doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2021.101595}

I think the goal of “laugh and think” is clearly successful in all of this research. But speaking of thinking, some of these research topics made me wonder (and maybe you are too): “Why would you investigate that?” (What adult would?) or “Is this real, funded/published research”? What I want to highlight (and what may not be clear from the brief list on the Wikipedia page), is that they all have proper references attached to them. So yes, though their published titles might sound a bit more academic or “stuffy” (though often by not much), they are actual peer-reviewed papers!

Are you ridiculing science?

This question on the official FAQ page caught my attention, because I, as an IgNoble enthusiast, hadn’t imagined any serious criticism against these awards. Digging a bit deeper, I found that decades ago, the UK’s then-chief scientific adviser – Sir Robert May – made a formal ~~complaint~~ request that “no British scientists (should) be considered for an IgNobel, for fear of harming their career prospects”. (Note that the UK, alongside Japan and the USA (no wonder I’m acquainted with this prize), are regulars of this prize as a nation, winning awards nearly every year.) Furthermore, the article reads “He was particularly concerned when ground-breaking research into the reasons why breakfast cereal becomes soggy (by the University of East Anglia) won a prize,” essentially hinting at the concern of public ridiculing science (as a whole?). If you think about it, such a general attitude of “it’s not with the scientific investigation unless it’s clearly applicable/translatable/important” is perhaps far too typical, especially in basic sciences.

However, I think the founder of the prize, Marc Abrahams, had the best defence against the practice of “rewarding silly science”.

“Most of the great technological and scientific breakthroughs were laughed at when they first appeared. People laughed at someone staring at the mould on a piece of bread, but without that there would be no antibiotics… A lot of people are frightened of science or think it is evil, because they had a teacher when they were 12 years old who put them off. If we can get people curious and make them laugh, maybe they will pick up a book one day. We really want more people involved in science and I think the webcast will help do that.”

Slightly on a tangent, but “Maths Anxiety” is a recognized experience that many develop during childhood. While no research might exist on this (yet), I also suspect a similar phenomenon with STEM at large. Sometimes I get comments from students taking humanities subjects (even in Cambridge!) like “wow, you’re doing a real/serious degree”, or “science sounds so difficult”. For some people, “being put off” by science might trace back to a negative experience during their first formal introduction to science as a subject in school. In that case, bringing their interest back to science with all-serious demeanor and stuffy topics might be quite a high barrier to cross. However, looking at the Ig award list from earlier, and how quickly they make you go “huh” after the laugh, I can’t help but think that these funny, curious studies might be the push they need to ignite their curiosity and welcome them back to scientific inquiry without any pressure.

The satire (and controversy?) of IgNobel

That being said, not all IgNobel prizes were specifically awarded to quirky “research that cannot (or should not) be reproduced”. It was also sometimes awarded as a satire. In the recent case of 2020, Ig Nobel Prize for Medical Education was awarded to Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil, Boris Johnson of the United Kingdom, Narendra Modi of India, Andrés Manuel López Obrador of Mexico, Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus, Donald Trump of the USA, Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, Vladimir Putin of Russia, and Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow of Turkmenistan. Now, before you start typing away your complaints and protests (or throwing paper airplanes), hear the reason why: they were awarded for “using the Covid-19 viral pandemic to teach the world that politicians can have a more immediate effect on life and death than scientists and doctors can”. I’d say that makes you think quite a bit, especially as a person in the scientific community.

If you consider these instances in isolation, perhaps there is some point to what the former scientific chief advisor was saying, and that a serious researcher might not want to be associated with this prize (kinda like the Raspberry award, I guess?). However, this was apparently not a popular opinion, at least in the UK scientific community, which backlashed at the comment earlier. To this day, we get awardees from the UK in the Ignobel prizes.

Legacy beyond the funny and curious:

Parody and satire, yes, but in case you think this is still a long post for much ado about nothing, as it’s still in the realm of a joke, I want to present you this final case of when these jokes lead to “actual” science (not that they weren’t real science to begin with, but…). Take Andre Geim for instance, who shared the 2000 Ig Nobel in Physics with Michael Berry for levitating a frog – yes, a real frog – using magnets. Ten years later, he went on to win the actual Nobel Prize in Physics for his groundbreaking research on graphene. This itself may sound like a lucky coincidence but it is also worth mentioning that this frog experiment was reported in 2022 to be the inspiration (at least partially) behind China’s lunar gravity research facility.

These are not the only examples where such “silly research” actually ended up having real-world impact and use. In 2006, the Ig Nobel Prize in Biology was awarded to a study showing that a species of malaria-carrying mosquitoes (Anopheles gambiae) is attracted equally to Limburger cheese smell and human foot odor. This initial study was published in 1996, and the results suggested the strategic placement of traps baiting this mosquito with Limburger cheese to combat the Malaria epidemic in Africa. While these applications of the study might not be immediate, I think what allows for this translation (aside from being oddly specific) is partly due to the cost-effectiveness. The more typical “scientific” solution one might envision with disease control might involve genomics, vaccines, or pharmaceuticals. While they are all state-of-the-art and highly effective (and certainly have the sci-fi appeal), the cost both in terms of financial and time resources, can be expensive. Compared to that… cheese? I’m guessing that it’s more budget friendly and easy to implement. This research as well as this year’s award in biology about painting (zebra-like) stripes to cows as a mosquito repellent, all make me re-appreciate that sometimes the viable solution might be something unexpectedly simple and close at hand. These studies show how science, even in its quirkiest forms, can indicate practical and effective solutions to improve everyday lives.

Diversification of sci-comm tactics

Whether you admire the nobleness of the Ig Nobel, think it’s all fun and whimsy sci-comm, or avoid it altogether as an aspiring “serious” researcher, I think this still stands as a rare gem in the diversity of what science-communication can look like. In recent years, “debunking style’ science communication is seemingly (back) on surge, as well as various independent video-based science communication content creators (such as the guest speaker we had last week). In the age where science itself and its institutions are increasingly seen through a critical eye or outright contested, I do understand the urge to fact bomb or even isolate myself in all the “seriousness”. This is especially tempting when we know that some of the fruit of scientific research, like vaccines, can save lives, and we desperately want people to protect themselves. I personally don’t consider myself especially witty, but celebrate those who can masterfully blend research and humor to entice audiences and reignite their interest in science. Of course, not a single sci-comm tactic is bulletproof – some, like Sir Robert, may find these things distasteful, while others simply prefer something “serious,” and that’s ok. But science as a community might just benefit from having such a quirky tactic under its sleeves, and the diversity in science communication approaches might very well be the best shot we’ve got for this day and age of increasing division. Who knows, maybe some researchers will look into the efficacy of the IgNobel prize headlines against the science-anxiety.

Fiscal Cakeism

Author: Andreas Kapounek (Treasurer and Sponsorships officer)

There are different ways to increase government revenue (a non-complete list):

Tax more
Grow the economy so the same percentage of tax leads to more revenue
Borrow more

Nevertheless, it often seems like politicians neglect the economic realities that trade-offs between these three streams pose.

Tax more? You run the threat of depressing economic growth (as you reduce the incentives to start or expand a business). This means you may end up with less revenue than with the previous, lower, tax burden. This becomes clear in the limit: in the extreme, a 100% income tax would remove any economic (!) incentive to pursue a job, likely leading to the loss of most jobs.

Borrow more? If the markets are led to believe that the government may not be as likely to pay back all of this larger amount of debt than they owed previously, they will ask the government to pay larger risk premiums to lend money to the government. In practice this means that the government will have to pay higher yields on government bonds, as perfectly illustrated by the recent hike in German “Bund” borrowing costs in response to the announcement to moderate the German debt brake to increase defense spending.

Paradoxically, the interplay between taxation and borrowing is what stumped some recent British governments: If you promise to cut taxes and keep expenditure the same, people will assume that you must borrow the difference, driving up borrowing costs. At the same time, if you promise to keep taxes the same but spend more, people will equally assume that you will have to borrow the difference.

So having explored the interplay between taxation and growth, we are left with one more way to fund expenditure: government debt. As the famous (well, in Austria at least) Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky said: “And when someone asks me what I think about debt, I tell them what I always say: that a few billion more in debt gives me fewer sleepless nights than a few hundred thousand unemployed people!” I believe most people agree with that statement in principle!

So why can more borrowing be bad? Borrowing can have adverse consequences, because it affects anyone in the country with debt. For example, it drives up the cost of mortgage repayments. Furthermore, it increases the cost of future government debt, making it harder (for example) to raise capital for urgent infrastructure repairs when needed. Or as John F. Kennedy (who might be more familiar to many readers of this blog than Bruno Kreisky) said, when advertising for more spending in economically robust times: “the time to repair the roof is when the sun is shining.”

All sides of the political landscape seem to appreciate these concepts when convenient but forget about them and selectively moralize these principles when not. At face value, it can be hard to see a necessary connection between economic policy and political philosophy. Believing that more borrowing without the matching growth expectations or unfunded tax cuts drive up the cost of debt (bond yields) is neither right-wing, left-wing, libertarian, capitalist, communist, or centrist: it is the best model of reality we currently have.

Least understandable about these moralist views on economics is that it seems as if we broadly agree on the goals we pursue in our economies: There is broad agreement that (other things being equal) more wealth is better than less wealth, better living standards are better than worse living standards, and a more equal income distribution is better than a less equal income distribution. I would broadly call these shared goals “good stuff”. Now, of course, there can be fervent arguments about the relative importance of these goals and this may be a legitimate driver of ideological differences. But surely, we should be opposed to any policy reducing all three and support policies improving all three goals.

There is strikingly much less political agreement on the goals pursued through social policy (people legitimately debate whether a more progressive or more conservative set of values is “better”). On contentious social issues such as reproductive rights, gun control, or school uniforms, people who differ in their political views often do not share a common set of policy goals.

But back to fiscal policy. What I would argue for, is a more honest approach to fiscal policy. It is perfectly legitimate to want to increase public services and equally legitimate to want to cut taxes if one has evidence that either measure may contribute to a more prosperous economy – but on this issue we really cannot have our cake and eat it.

The discussion above has largely focused on taxing and borrowing, but has broadly neglected the size of the economy. To stay with our ill-fitting cake metaphor – perhaps, if we just grow the cake, there will be some to have and some to eat? There is! But growing the economy is hard and getting harder.

As our advanced economies have matured over the second half of the 20^th century into the 21^st, the technological advances required to support high growth have increased. While it may have been really fruitful to build the Channel Tunnel it would add almost no utility to the European economy to now dig another one. Inventing the iPhone added great value to the economy but “inventing” the iPhone 367 might only marginally grow GDP and living standards. This is also why China is outgrowing the West but is not projected to catch up in per capita terms anytime soon – as they approach the Western level, their growth rates are expected to flatline too. AI might change this logic – but for now, the iron logic of marginal returns is tightening its screws on economic progress.

We should and can be honest about this – in some way, we can even be proud of this. Never in the history of humankind has there been a better time to be alive than today and it is objectively hard to improve the current situation quickly.

There is hope: We are not in the dark about our progress. Economists have spent decades putting the concepts so amateurishly (and in an oversimplified way) articulated by me in this blog into formulas. These formulas do not quite have the predictive power of Newtonian physics (Einstein did away with that anyways!), and acting as if they were a perfect description of the world can be dangerous. While the mathematical modelling underlying classical economics is fantastically rigorous, many concepts have not been experimentally validated (but this topic may need to wait for another blog post). Furthermore, in no way should this blog post diminish alternatives to current economic theories when these alternative descriptions of the economy are model based, yield testable predictions, and these predictions turn out to be true when tested: in fact, I would argue one should be agnostic to dogma and ideology, and focused solely on accurately describing reality, making sure to update beliefs when new evidence arises. Progress should be guided by the scientific method and controlled experiments where possible – if someone serves a piece of cake to 1000 participants, which all proceed to have it and eat it, I might have to find new metaphors. Nevertheless, most current models are performing much better than random guessing at forecasting developments in our economy and are our best available tool to shape policy.

Therefore, we do have means to make educated guesses about which policies may increase “good stuff” and which policies may decrease “good stuff”. Maximizing “good stuff” should guide our fiscal, monetary and economic policy – and nothing else.

Therefore, we should:

Improve and verify our methods to forecast “good stuff” and create policies accordingly
Apply these policies
Measure the effects and adjust policies accordingly

CUSAP After Hours: Debate with compassion while sharping your philosophical razors

Author: Maya Lopez (Blog Chief Editor)

Following our first event in 2024 which was more of a lecture format, we then had a workshop on debating – but with a dash of compassion – to see if we can really change minds. This was organized by our two co-chairs of CUSAP, where we discussed the theories and practical tips on addressing conversations with misinformed individuals and some role-playing in a relaxed at-home evening at Queen’s. Here are some of the takeaway messages I got from the session, a few tricks that everyone can have under their sleeve to be a better communicator, and a handful of “philosophical razors” to further sharpen critical thinking.

So why should I even “debate”?:

A long long time ago in my previous life as a teenager, I used to attend academic debate events. I often hear people say you’ll learn to love the things you’re good at. But for me, receiving awards in debates was never really enjoyable. Academic debates (especially those meant to discuss truly debatable topics) are inherently about the art of debate and presentation. Hence typical signs of toxic online debaters could apply here too: it could resemble a play of words, a heated battle going back and forth, and tactfully trying to point out the opponent’s logical flaws (ie, being a nitpicking jerk aiming for the GOTCHA moment). Somehow the better I scored, the more I felt like a… horrible person.

And really, anyone doing this even in the calmest manner in everyday life is far from likable and most likely won’t convince others with different opinions. (Case and point, Socrates might have many philosophy and logical frameworks credited to him, but arguably what sent him to his death row is his bona fide troll-ness…). Furthermore, in academic debate, there is more or less a referee to fact-check – but who is there to do that in real-time in everyday conversations?

This is why I personally shied away from debates as I hit college – it was mentally draining and felt even like pulling the worst out of me. But naturally, there are times in life when you will encounter those with different opinions – hopefully just a “debatable” opinion – but what if some of such “opinions” are harmful? or dangerous? or demeaning? It may be more immoral to NOT debate – or really to show and persuade other ways of thinking. So this CUSAP event was also my personal journey to re-study debate in a different light – as a way to empathize and suggest different ways to look at things with compassion.

So then, what’s the trick?

We covered many theories during the session but here are a few highlights:

Golden minute → A technique commonly practiced by clinicians where they give about a minute at the beginning of patient examination to just let the patient describe all of their symptoms. Being attentive during this minute through other active listening techniques without interrupting can not only make your patient feel heard but also give a great opportunity to let their emotion and perceptions be shared. Similarly in the context of misinformation debate, the person who you are talking to might very well be in some sort of unease or (emotional) pain. So give them time to let it out. …and academic debate-wise, this is quite tactful ~~because you let the opponent reveal their cards first~~… But all jokes aside, listening is a genuinely underestimated aspect of a conversation because it’s easy for us to carry in our bias too. We might assume where their misinformations are coming from and attribute that to certain personality characteristics. So let them speak before we make unfair assumptions.
Good faith principle → Speaking of unfair assumptions, this next technique literally is just that. It is apparently even a way of thinking by law, and as a word suggests, one should not assume that the misinformation/conspiracy theory is coming from a bad intent. Of course, the boundaries of mis and disinformation can be murky, but in most daily contexts, what are the odds of encountering individuals who profit off of spreading post-truth? Rather than an evil mastermind, it’s more likely that we are just talking to someone who’s genuinely confused, agitated, concerned, or scared.
New information over denial of info → Bombarding with denial (ie ~~screaming~~ telling YOU’RE WRONG), is quite ineffective at altering beliefs. Studies suggest a difficulty in people simply changing beliefs when they are presented with opposing facts because cognitively these two juxtaposing facts will need to compete over the position of the belief. So rather than confronting the misinformation head-on, we could just present new information that will make the listener think (or better yet question) the premises of their conclusion.

Let’s say a person takes an anti-COVID vaccine stance which they say is because they can’t trust evil pharma and this is just a scam to make a profit. Sure, big pharma is a company too which is profit driven. But, I read that AZ didn’t make a profit with the Covid-19 vaccines. Also, there are worldwide equitable programs like COVAX, no? …Hopefully partially agreeing, but also showing new facts regarding their premise of all big pharma projects = bad will get them to explore views instead of if we were to just opposing their conclusion that COVID vaccine = bad. Of course, this is not bulletproof, and this can lead us to….

Steel-man tactic → The person you were talking to doubled down and argued that vaccines bad because big pharma bad. Okay, then you know what, let’s explore that together. You may know this tactic’s evil twin brother called straw-man which just dodges the bullet, but in this case, you purposely bolster their argument and then explore what their strongest version of the argument will look like. An interesting post here details the process we can put into practice, but essentially this will allow the two parties in conversation to be together on the same page to explore nuances. Who knows, maybe you’ll end up agreeing with the big-pharma-bad part and the difficulties in capitalism in general, at which point is this at all about vaccines? and off we go to the anti-capitalism march! Or maybe there will be some nuances: well not all projects are bad I guess, especially if particular projects are non-profit. Either way, exploring further into the why behind the misinformed conclusion, can lead to constructive exploration, leading ultimately to an undated conclusion.

Of course, there were a lot more tips that we covered in the workshop, but I personally think it boils down to our intent. Think about why we want to persuade them. Most likely, we care about them to some degree. Then show that. TELL THEM THAT. In fact, I’d argue that if your intent to “debate” is just to show off your “smartness” (not even for the knowledge’s sake but especially to “put them down”) perhaps you should not be engaging this in the first place. Perhaps, we need to first ask ourselves about the good faith principle – and if we fail this litmus test, we may do more harm than good.

Some final thoughts and sharpening your critical thinking with philosophical razors

Overall, this was a very uniquely CUSAP workshop – not just because of the theme around pseudoscience, but because it reflects our will to improve as a empathic communicator. It is perhaps far too common amongst academic circles to be lost in the pleasure of the logical precision and vast amount of facts we can present about a topic during a debate. This may be an excellent tactic in academic debates, but our intellect should also realize that to change the hearts of others, we can’t just end in such “self-indulgence”. While I say this, it’s not an easy feat (I’m most definitely a beginner in the techniques mentioned above). Besides, we are people too, and when topics are touchy as pseudoscience, it is fair to acknowledge that it might hurt our feelings just a bit too – being denied of our daily efforts in pursuit of science -.

Furthermore, just because you are a student of STEM doesn’t automatically immunize us to pseudoscience too. Even before debating others in an attempt to persuade, our own logic and perception should be also challenged (albeit, as a CUSAP member I do recommend standing firmly on the ground that we are convinced to be scientific, and acknowledge that not absolutely everything is a matter of perspective). In an attempt to persuade, is our explanation getting overly convoluted? Shave it down with your trusty Occam’s razor! Did we poorly phrase how we think things “ought” to happen, by making a sudden leap from what IS taking place based on our preconceived notions and expectations? Even if this is from good intentions, philosophically these two notions should be separated with Hume’s guillotine!

At this rate, it feels like swiss-army-full of these philosophical razors will sharpen your critical thinking to make a perfect debate case, but don’t get yourself too carried away. In the context of pseudoscience, it’s tempting to pull out Alder’s razor, which claims that if something cannot be experimentally tested or through observations, then it is not worthy of debate. Especially in many pseudoscience topics, this might be the kneejerk reaction you will gravitate to (you know that it is a waste of time to even contemplate Earth is flat!). But this razor has its cavitate where this philosophy itself is not “scientifically validatable” and at which points it puts the whole premise under a strain. This is where we might have to dial down on this whole dismissive attitude toward all “unprovable” theories (and hence how our science is right), but rather focus on the theories that can be proven wrong using Popper’s razor (also known as the Popper’s falsifiability principle). While this will allow us to present the best scientific theory that is not currently falsified, should we be debating “theories” so fundamentally fantastical with equal priority as those at least partially based on scientific reality? We can use Sagan’s razor (aka Sagan’s standard) to cut down such extraordinary claims that are not supported with extraordinary evidence, to ultimately pick our games.

There are still more of these philosophical razors, but at the end of the day whether these concepts help us with critical thinking or the debate tactics we learned in the session are all something that can’t be done easily without practice. Sometimes the conversation will get emotional, and sometimes the conversation happens at the wrong moment when things are very personal. While practicing these skills on the go out in public, therefore, might seem scary, I think CUSAP has cultivated a safe space for all of us – united with the goal of betterment – to explore and discuss our ideas. Putting this knowledge to the test and practicing our “art of compassionate debate”.

If this kind of science philosophy is your spiel or you just want to boost your science communication skills (and trust me, we hold a lot of casual, at-home vibe sessions!), consider joining us at the CUSAP mailing list or Instagram. Come say hi at one of the upcoming events if you can make it 🙂

Sources and Recommended Reading:

Most sources are hyperlinked in the text but here are some few key picks:

Academic review on drivers of misinformation belief and difficulties in correcting: https://www.nature.com/articles/s44159-021-00006-y
Short crisp blog on steel-man tactics: https://aliabdaal.com/newsletter/the-steelman-argument/
Youtube video about making a “Swiss-Army Knife” with Philosophical razors (it’s in Japanese): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PEbRlW4TX0Y&t=13s
English Wikipedia page has a good list of them too: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_razor

Unpacking Immigration Misinformation in The 2024 Elections: Claims, Facts, and Psychological Influence

Author: Leila Yukou Lai (Speakers and Academics Officer)

During the 2024 elections in both the UK and the US, immigration emerged as a prominent issue in political campaigns. Figures like Farage claimed that,

“Mass immigration is making Britain poorer……. half of the immigrants coming to the UK are dependents who do not work”

“We need to prepare for Channel migrant ‘invasion’ from countries ‘with terrorism, gang culture and war zones”

“Immigrants are causing divisions in communities and have made the UK unrecognisable”

Similarly, Trump’s campaigns included assertions such as,

“We have more terrorists coming into our country now than we’ve ever had – ever in history, and this is a bad thing. We have thousands of terrorists coming into our country”

“They are eating the cats and dogs”

“They are taking away your jobs”

Some of these statements are partial truths, while others are false information. This article will fact-check the prominent immigration-related claims from the 2024 elections. We will examine how political campaigns leverage concerns like economic threats, national security fears, and cultural anxieties to create sensationalised perceptions of immigration that shape public discourse in ways often misaligned with the underlying realities of the issues. Additionally, we will examine the psychological roots and impacts of immigration narratives.

We will further discuss practical strategies for addressing and countering such narratives in everyday life in our Feb 4th Event, so please register to join if it interests you.

Fact-Checking Prominent Claims & The Psychological Roots

Economic Threats

Claim	Facts
“Mass immigration is making Britain poor……half of those that have come aren’t coming to work, they’re coming as dependants”Farage	The former part of the claim can be debunked by research led by Professor Dustmann from UCL, which found that immigrants to the UK, particularly those from the EEA and post-2004 EU accession states, made significant positive fiscal contributions, with EEA immigrants contributing 34% more in taxes than they received in benefits and recent EU immigrants adding £20 billion to the public purse. In contrast, UK natives’ tax payments fell 11% short of the benefits they received, resulting in a net cost of £617 billion. The latter part of the claim is partially accurate. The inaccuracy lies in the overall visa statistics, as only one-third of visas issued (all types) in the most recent reporting period were for dependents. However, regarding work visas specifically, he is almost correct—43% were dependents. Nevertheless, he omitted the fact that these dependents are ineligible for benefits but allowed to work, positioning them to potentially contribute to the economy rather than becoming a burden which he falsely implies.
“Immigrants are taking away your jobs”Trump	This claim can be debunked by insights from Economics research and experts. Firstly, economists from the Brookings Institution suggest that immigrants often fill labor-intensive positions, such as gutting fish or working in farm fields, which are typically shunned by native-born workers. This suggests that immigrants are not necessarily competing for the same jobs as the majority of American workers. In addition, analyses from the US National Bureau of Economic Research (2024) reports that immigration does not significantly drive down wages for American workers overall. Building on this, it’s noteworthy that, although immigrants represent around 15 percent of the general U.S. workforce, they account for about a quarter of the country’s entrepreneurs and inventors, according to Harvard Business Review. By creating new businesses and innovations, immigrants contribute to job creation and economic growth, further undermining the notion that they simply displace American workers.

National Security Threats

Claim	Facts
“We have more terrorists coming into our country now than we’ve ever had – ever in history, and this is a bad thing. We have thousands of terrorists coming into our country” Trump	This claim implies more terrorists have entered the US under the Biden ministration, which is misleading. Data from U.S Department of Homeland Security indicates that the actual number of individuals on the terrorist watchlist caught at the border is in the hundreds (139 at the southern border and 283 at the northern border as of July 2023), not the thousands as Trump claimed. Furthermore, since the 2021 fiscal year (the beginning of the Biden administration), the number of individuals on the U.S. government’s terrorist watchlist apprehended at the borders has increased each year. This trend indicates that border screening measures have become more rigorous, rather than more lenient as Trump suggested.
“We need to prepare for Channel migrant ‘invasion’ from countries ‘with terrorism, gang culture and war zones”Farage	While it is true that the top foreign nationals involved in UK terror-related offenses from 2002 to 2021 were people from Algeria, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, Somalia, India, and Sri Lanka, it is important to note that these offenses represent a small fraction of their respective communities in the UK. In the year ending 30 September 2024, the highest number of terrorist crimes were still conducted by UK nationals and those who are ethnically White, according to data from the Home Office. Research published in the British Journal of Political Science shows there is little evidence indicating more migration unconditionally leads to more terrorist activity, especially in Western countries.

Cultural Anxieties

Claim	Facts
“Immigrants are causing divisions in communities and have made the UK unrecognisable”Farage	Concerns about cultural identity are rather subjective and difficult to address purely with data. However, Farage’s claim can still be challenged, a review conducted by the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society at the University of Oxford, which concludes that higher ethnic diversity in UK localities does not consistently correlate with higher social tension. Instead, local economic factors (e.g., unemployment, funding for public services) are more predictive of community conflict. Therefore, this claim of immigration undermining social cohesion lacks credibility.
“In Springfields, they are eating the cats and dogs”Trump	This claim was fostered by a comment made by Trump’s running mate, JD Vance, who later admitted in an interview with CNN that he was willing to “create stories” to get his message across. According to state officials from Ohio, even Republican leader Mike Dewine, there is no credible evidence to support the rumor that immigrants in Springfield, Ohio, are stealing or eating pets. Local law enforcement and animal control records do not reflect any such incidents, and no verified reports exist.

Sensationalised Language, Psychological Impact of Immigration Narratives

Having clarified the relevant facts, let’s now examine the linguistic choice employed by conservative leaders in their claims about immigration. Even if some of their claims are partially correct, it is undeniable that the statements are highly sensationalised and crafted to elicit strong emotional responses. This dynamic was evident in Ohio, where baseless allegations about the Haitian community in Springfield eating pets triggered public panic and a wave of hoax bomb threats. Similarly, in England, false narratives claiming that an asylum seeker was the perpetrator of a knife attack in Southport, though not directly linked to Farage’s claims, led to widespread riots spanning from Plymouth to Sunderland.

One reason such rhetoric remains effective is its reliance on several psychological phenomena, including in-group/out-group biases and the negativity bias. For instance, using language like “invasion”, Farage portrays migrants as an external force poised to disrupt national order, framing the situation in a way that elicits anxiety and heightens threat perception. This framing aligns with Social Identity Theory, whereby the in-group (domestic population) feels compelled to defend itself against the out-group (immigrants). Similarly, when Trump claims immigrants are “taking away your jobs” or there are “thousands of terrorists coming into our country”, he is tapping into the negativity bias which refers to the human tendency to pay more attention to, and be more influenced by, negative or threatening information than by neutral or positive details. These emotional depictions overshadow data indicating, for instance, the benefits that immigration brings to local economies or that instances of immigrant-linked terrorism are statistically rare.

In addition, repeated exposure to a single narrative can increase people’s belief in its accuracy, even when that information is demonstrably false. Therefore, simply by the virtue of repetition, political campaigns can embed the same message into public consciousness without necessarily adhering to factual accuracy. As a result, it is challenging for data-driven clarifications about immigration to break through the emotional impact of sensational rhetoric. Nonetheless, recognising these psychological levers is a crucial step toward fostering more nuanced, evidence-based discussions on immigration, rather than allowing panic and misinformation to drive policy and public sentiment.

Susceptibility to Immigration Misinformation

Research suggests that individuals with higher levels of ethnic moral disengagement are more likely to believe in racial hoaxes. Moral disengagement occurs when an individual justifies or rationalises harmful beliefs or behaviours, often by dehumanising out-groups or reframing actions as morally acceptable. This cognitive process allows individuals to convince themselves that commonly accepted ethical standards don’t apply to them, hindering their empathetic capacity, especially toward marginalised groups. Such tendencies are often linked to authoritarian worldviews, which favor strict hierarchies and resist social change, making these individuals particularly susceptible to immigration misinformation.

Our speakers for the upcoming event, Dr. Tessa Buchanan and Malia Marks, have both conducted research on the relationship between authoritarian tendencies and susceptibility to immigration misinformation, and they will share their findings with us further at the event. Their insights will not only shed light on the psychological dynamics of misinformation but also equip us with tools to critically assess narratives surrounding immigration. We invite you to join us on Feb 5th at the Queen’s College, Cambridge for a fruitful discussion.

CUSAP After Hours: Pseudoscience – the Science through the Looking Glass

Author: Maya Lopez (Blog Chief Editor)

One way to describe pseudoscience is perhaps a distorted science. In some way or another, they present features that feel scientific, even to an exaggerated level. However, as the mirror separates the un-melding reality and its reflection, such distinction can be made between science and its reflection – pseudoscience. Today we will explore such philosophical grounds to prevent pseudoscience from infiltrating reality in this post-truth day and age. To this end, we will look into the original philosophical definitions and key takeaways I got from a special lecture – our first official event of this academic year – by Prof. Hasok Chang. He has also been supporting us as Senior Treasurer from the inception of our society. The lecture posed a deceivingly simple but surprising philosophical question: What is Pseudoscience? And the clue to this question lies about 100 years ago, on May 29, 1919.

Arthur Eddington, the director of Cambridge Observatory led an expedition to observe the solar eclipse to test the theory of relativity. Eddington and Dyson positioned themselves at Principe Island, while another expedition team with Crommelin and Davidson was in Brazil. Together they were challenging Einstein’s Theory of Relativity. If it was correct and the light is indeed bent by gravity, stars in the Taurus constellation would be visible during the eclipse, positioned differently compared to the calculations by Newtonian physics. Together, they made the observation that marks history: stars aligned with Einstein’s theory.

However, this was not the only history that was being made on this day. This story influenced a young 17-year-old in Vienna, and to quote himself “(it) had a lasting influence on my intellectual development.” Karl Propper would eventually become the philosopher who explored the philosophical distinction between knowledge based on science and what he coined as pseudoscience.

But first, what is science?

To unravel the question of pseudoscience, we first had to test our own perception of science itself. This may seem straightforward, based on what we learned about the scientific method in middle school. But what is science, really? More specifically in Popper’s words:

When should a theory be ranked as scientific?”

Surprisingly, this was a question that modern philosophers had never fully characterized up until Popper. While characterizing vast and wide “science” itself may be difficult, we can find the constituents of things we deem scientific.

So let’s lay some on the table. Many aspects of what we often perceive as scientific might be a little something like: quantitative, explanatory, and empirical. However, all these aspects are in fact well conserved in other domains that we also could define as – in Popper’s terms – pseudoscience (or at least non-hard/natural science). For example, consider the “social science” domain like Economics. Modern Economics also uses models that can be expressed in equations, presenting itself as more heavily mathematical than perhaps some of the medical sciences. Now let’s consider the next aspect on the list: explanatory. Conspiracy theories are no match in terms of explaining things – the icebergs can get so deep and it’s bulletproofed against all counterarguments, because see? Interpret it this way and it’s just another proof that absolutely everything ties back to the Deep State! But then, at least hard science is the most empirical approach to knowledge… right?

Objective and empirical data gathered from replicable experiments… but words like “objective” and “replicable” are not as clear-cut as one may hope. After all, to those who believe in pseudoscientific theories such as Flat Earthers, their experiences are indeed genuine replicable “experiments” that can be tallied and quantified objectively. So, these typical “qualities of science” like empirical-ness are unfortunately a matter of perspective and not a uniquely defining factor. To further complicate the matter, such a struggle for replicability is also in the world of actual sciences. Major natural science publications have been noting the “replicability crisis” for years, and it is important to acknowledge that even with a genuine intention of scientific experiment, small differences in interpretation and methods can pave the way to this replicability crisis.

…So by now, if you are feeling more confused about what science than before we started, fret not because this is very confusing. According to Prof. Chang, many undergrads facing this question in the HPS course will very often fall into the same pitfalls of presumed scientific qualities as those listed earlier. When pseudoscience at its core seems to mirror – and sometimes “outperforms” in – so many key qualities of science, and when in fact some cases of “pseudoscientific” theories turned out to be the basis of the next science and vice versa, you can’t help but wonder: Is there no way to identify science from the pseudoscience? While it is indeed not a clear-cut line to separate the two, luckily there is a philosophical distinction to be made.

Falsifiability and Popper’s observation on “predicting” the present vs. predicting the future

Back to Popper in Vienna, the early 1900s was an unprecedented epoch in the field of knowledge. A new realm of physics was being proposed by Einstein. Historical Materialism was proposed by Karl Marx as a new view on history, and the relationship of observed human behavior as a phenomenon is now seemingly explainable by Sigmund Freud’s Psycho-analysis. At the time, these frontiers of knowledge were arguably treated with equal weight as new theories that pushed the boundaries of the scientific mainstream. However, Popper concluded that not all “scientific achievement” was made equally depending on whether the method of obtaining the knowledge was to confirm an existing belief OR to actively attempt to disprove the unreality of the null hypotheses.

Let’s unpack that concept following the footsteps of Popper himself. Popper used to take the lectures by Einstein and was studying the psychoanalytic of Freud. One day, he asked Alfred Adler himself (an ex-colleague of Freud who eventually formed his own theory of individual psychology) about a case report that was seemingly not… Adlerian. Yet when asked, Adler easily explained the case using his theory, leaving no discrepancy. Given that Adler has never analyzed the individual of the case, Popper asked why he could be so sure to which Adler replied that his thousands of former experiences support this theory.

And this, was ultimately what distinguished Einstein’s theory to be the only truly scientific theory amongst the list earlier. Adlerian theory in this case was used to “predict” why the behavior had/has been taking place and it is so hard to “disprove” a retrospective interpretation. Similar criticism can also be applied to (in?)famous Freudian psychology. While still regarded as the foundations of modern psychology, it hasn’t aged too well when it comes to how “scientific” his theories are where every feminine intimacy issue is seemingly rooted in male genitalia envy and daddy issues. They explain why certain psychological phenomena happened so well by encapsulating them into logically constructed theoretical frameworks (although even then, it did cause disagreements, leading colleagues like Adler and Jung to depart). While such Freudian theories gave us the satisfaction of feeling like we understand why things are – this is still a retrospective explanation of a past – an explanation behind the known result. They didn’t, however, do as well when it comes to predicting unseen future behaviors – which often scientific hypothesis aims to do. This importance of how you verify scientific claims is perhaps akin to association and causation in modern medical science. Even if substance X is correlated with say cancer, you can only scientifically show that it causes cancer if you set up an experiment where you put that substance – in say mice or cell culture – to test your prediction on “unseen future” by seeing if it does form cancer or not. While you could always reinterpret past events (or interpret dreams in Freud’s case) to support your theory, if the cancer didn’t form or the stars didn’t align in 1919, the scientific theory is simply not working.

Furthermore, Popper brings in a new approach to this philosophical limitation of verificationism – falsificationism. In brief, Popper’s realization of the distinctively “scientific” approach to a theory by Einstein, led to philosophical conclusions that focus on how science actively disproves future possibilities to approach truth while pseudoscience (as in nature of the knowledge rather than modern conspiratory connotation per se) focuses on proving and explaining past phenomena. Following is the excerpt of his writing from 1962 outlining this concept in detail:

It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory—if we look for confirmations.

Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; that is to say, if, unenlightened by the theory in question, we should have expected an event which was incompatible with the theory—an event which would have refuted the theory.

Every ‘good’ scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is

A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is nonscientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice.

Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. Testability is falsifiability; but there are degrees of testabilty: some theories are more testable, more exposed to refutation, than others; they take, as it were, greater risks.

Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test of the theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory. …

Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers—for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by re-interpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status. (I later [after 1920 –NS] described such a rescuing operation as a ‘conventionalist twist’ or a ‘conventionalist stratagem’.)

This was a revolutionary approach to thinking: only by interrogating your hypothesis by exploring other opposing possibilities, you can be confident about your theory. Furthermore, this lends to the idea that one day, when we do get an observation that contradicts our model, our standing theory will be then proven wrong. However, Popper believed that every falsified theory is “good” because we were able to rule out a possibility, putting us closer to the truth. This is perhaps the beauty and the complexity of the scientific method: it’s a long, iterative process of elimination, but we get closer to understanding the world, one step at a time.

Being comfortable with uncertainty

While now we have some philosophical grounds to determine which knowledge is more scientific than the other, this inevitably opened up another eerie reality: uncertainty. Scientifically, you can be confident that something is most likely a correct representation of the truth – but this is far from the solid explanatory fact -THE truth! – we all crave. After all, being confident about a theory still leaves room for the probability of exceptions. Science is inherently uncertain.

Nevertheless, the volatility of “truth”, is arguably the very appeal for aspiring scientists. You are off to an adventure of the unknown and you are using any tools to best encapsulate the mysterious nature lying in front of you. While this is a romanticized view from a reader of science myself, I can easily imagine that from anyone outside of the adventure crew, we can appear as a bumbling mess at times or worse, untrustworthy contradictorians and a hypocrite.

Many of the modern scientific achievements progressed through the process of falsification. This ultimately lends itself to denying at least part of the former discoveries, and thus individual reports across a timeline may appear contradictory. Even if this is inevitable and the reality is often more nuanced than the black-and-white “contradiction”, we must admit: flip-flopping on conclusion appears unprincipled and possibly dangerous for fields that directly affect life like medicine. Imagine if you asked a friend for advice. This person says one thing but then next month, does a complete 180 and even stack up evidence on why you were not supposed to do that. The explanation is certainly factual and logical, but the emotional appeal on whether you can trust this guy is put on a pedestal because it ultimately makes YOU responsible – requiring you to put in the work with a thinking cap.

In some circumstances, this might feel liberating. You are in charge of your thoughts based on a knowledgeable friend with references to back up different claims. But if you’re in your lows, or if you are in a desperate situation? This is too much – you might even find this friend irresponsible because you wanted advice to follow. In such a scenario, another friend – a more charismatic, authoritative figure who TELLS you specifically how to think with absolute certainty, and taking that red pill is all of a sudden more appealing.

So… is science doomed to lose the trust over pseudoscience?

Through the lecture, we explored further case studies of pseudoscience, attempts to change people’s minds, and personal experiences shared by Prof. Chang. But for today, I would like to round up with one of our key ongoing questions as CUSAP: What can science as a community do to be more trusted?

There is unfortunately no simple or singular answer (and yes, this is a cheat code academics use to jade the rest of the society, sorry). However, I think scientists themselves have a lot more we can do to change how society perceives science. I will even call it mandatory for scientists to care about this question and public communication of our work. Combatting the distrust should be the paramount importance to our profession, because we didn’t go through the painstaking process of all these degrees to be demarked as fraudsters, right? Are we not searching for truth to better understand the world? To better the world as we know it?

Partly, I declare this because I understand that it is not easy. Despite how Hollywood may portray “academic figures” like Nazi-fighting Indiana or tech-superman epitomized by Iron Man, science IS NOT THAT GLAMOROUS! Spending 4-6 hours (or more….) tending your cells (or counting god forbid), running around the field, and weekend lab time to feed your cultures – you may be surprised at how much “tedious” stuff takes place under the hood. Of course, for some, every moment of this work might be a pure joy – because they LOVE what they do -. But for many, like all jobs, there can be bits that we don’t particularly love.

But then what keeps us driving is the sheer belief that this search into reality will mean something. For medical researchers, this may be for our health. And how ironic is it if we are stuck in our ivory tower preaching our findings to better the society and no one trust what we say? Maybe it’s time to say goodbye to the genius scientist archetype or the heroic tech-bro myths, take off this facade of “logical (and thereby superior), non-emotional intellectuals”, and embrace our emotional drive. Because we care about facts AND emotion, for we love and care about the world of wonders – including everyone that inhabits it 🙂

If this kind of science philosophy is your spiel or you just want to learn some new cool misconceptions surrounding science (and trust me, just being a STEMM student does not make you immune to this!), consider joining us at the CUSAP mailing list or Instagram. Come say hi at one of the upcoming events if you can make it.

Sources and recommended reading:

Popper’s Account of Scientiﬁc Theories (1962)
Adam Smith Institute’s article “Einstein, and the importance of testing”
Further article on Karl Popper with references
A good summary video on the philosophy of falsificationism:

Using Critical Thinking to Build Resilience Against Misinformation Professor – Prof. John Cook

We welcomed Professor John Cook, Research Assistant Professor at the Center for Climate Change Communication at George Mason University, for our first presentation of Lent term. Prof. Cook has built on decades of research into inoculation theory in the field of behavioural psychology, and in his talk, discussed how this may be applied to climate change denial.

His talk, titled “Using Critical Thinking to Build Resilience Against Misinformation”, delved into his research into inoculation theory, a suggested framework for stopping the spread of misinformation.

The key feature of inoculation theory is that it exposes people to a “weakened form” of misinformation. A warning is displayed before the misinformation is shown and this is then followed by an explanation of the relevant counter-arguments. The aim of this technique is to train people to recognise the overarching characteristics of science denial when they encounter misinformation in day-to-day life. Professor Cook groups these practices into a set of five main characteristics:

Fake experts: The practice of presenting an unqualified person or institution as a source of credible, expert information.
Logical fallacies: When the assumptions of an argument do not lead to the conclusion.
Impossible expectations: The act of demanding unrealistic standards of certainty before acting on science, when science can never give absolute certainty on any finding.
Cherry picking: When data are carefully selected to appear to confirm one position while ignoring other data that contradict that position.
Conspiracy theories: When it is assumed that that there is a scheme planned by those with nefarious intent, without sufficient evidence to support this.

One of the highlights of this talk was the discussion of parallel argumentation – a method used effectively to demonstrate the ways in which misinformation is logically untrue. This process involves transplanting the flawed logic used by a piece of misinformation to another scenario, showing the absurdity of the logic. An example can be seen in Professor Cook’s comic strip below.

*CrankyUncle comic depicting parallel augmentation.*

Prof. Cook goes on to discuss the challenges faced combating misinformation and suggests psychological and behavioural reasons for the spread of misinformation in today’s society.

The “Cranky Uncle” app, developed by Prof. Cook, presents a possible solution to these problems. It hosts a game that teaches players about misinformation and encourages competition, to be the best at spotting it. Prof. Cook believes this app has the potential to break into echo chambers and teach critical thinking skills to children, if it were implemented in a school setting.

CUSAP is grateful to Professor Cook for joining us to share his fascinating research and innovative solutions to the global problem of misinformation. The practical application of inoculation theory demonstrates a way in which the spread of misinformation and pseudoscience can be countered and suggests we all have a role to play in inoculating ourselves and others.

Eilidh Hughes | Climate Change Awareness Officer, Students Against Pseudoscience

A critical look at so-called alternative medicine (SCAM) – Prof. Edzard Ernst

We welcome Prof Edzard Ernst, formerly Professor of Complementary Medicine at the University of Exeter, the first such academic position in the world. He is founder of three medical journals and has been a columnist for many publications. His work has been awarded with 17 scientific awards (most recently the John Maddox Prize in 2015 and the Ockham Award in 2017) and two Visiting Professorships. During the last 25 years, Prof Ernst’s research focused on the critical evaluation of almost all aspects of so-called alternative medicine (SCAM). He does not aim to promote SCAM, but provide objective evidence, reliable information and critical assessments of this work.

‘So-called alternative medicine (SCAM) can be defined as an umbrella term for a diverse range of therapeutic and diagnostic modalities which have little in common – other than being “outside” the mainstream of medicine. More than 400 different modalities have been counted. Well-known examples include acupuncture, chiropractic, herbalism and homeopathy.

In my lecture, I will use but a few examples and explain that, for most SCAMs, there is no convincing evidence of effectiveness. I will also demonstrate that many SCAMs have been associated with serious risks. Finally, I will show that only very few SCAMs generate more good than harm. It follows, I think, that integrating more and more of SCAM into routine healthcare is ill-advised.’ – Prof Ernst

This talk was co-hosted with Cambridge BioSoc.

On The Ethics of Vaccination – Prof. Julian Savulescu

Arguably the best chance of escape from the COVID-19 pandemic is vaccination. But growing vaccine hesitancy has already jeopardised herd immunity for diseases such as the measles. A new vaccine, for a disease that poses a lower risk than measles, for much of the population, is likely to be subject to similar concerns. Indeed, polling conducted by GALLUP in October 2020 suggests that up to 42% of Americans would not take the vaccine right away.

This talk explores if and when a mandatory vaccination programme can be acceptable, and argues that it would be premature for COVID-19 vaccinations. The speaker goes on to suggest that if a voluntary programme is insufficient, a payment model could be used to increase uptake whilst preserving autonomy.

Professor Julian Savulescu is holder of the Uehiro Chair in Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford. His research surrounds the ethics of various new and emerging technologies, such as new methods of reproduction and enhancement of physical and cognitive performance through drugs or genetic manipulation. We would once again like to express our many thanks for his time.